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ABSTRACT 
As organizational environments become more turbulent and complex and as 
uncertainty about the future increases, reliance on quantitative decision-making 
approaches for strategic planning becomes less appropriate. Scenario analysis can 
be an effective qualitative technique for enhancing strategic planning. Typically, 
scenarios are presented as alternate futures. Some theorists, however, have 
suggested that forward and backward thinking are different cognitive processes. In 
this study, we investigate the effect of presenting scenarios retrospectively; that is, 
as if future events had already happened. 
A repeated measures laboratory study compared the performance of 
professional planners (n = 64) using prospective and retrospective scenarios in two 
simulated business planning tasks. Measures consisted of objective factors 
(number of individual planning statements and number of monitoring statements), 
subjective factors (quality based on an 18-question rating instrument), and subject 
attitudes concerning their experience with the two treatments. 
Results suggest that use of retrospective scenarios do increase the number of 
planning statements. In addition, plans prepared using retrospective scenarios 
were rated higher overall than those prepared with prospective scenarios. 
Moreover, evidence emerged that a subset of subjects were better able to make use 
of the retrospective technique, suggesting that selection along with training may 
improve planning performance. 
(STRATEGIC PLANNING; STRATEGY FORMULATION; SCENARIOS; 
STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS; DECISION-MAKING; DECISION 
SUPPORT SYSTEMS; CREATIVITY) 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally acknowledged today that uncertainty is increasing for most 
organizations. Events such as the sweeping political and economic changes in Eastern 
Europe and turmoil in the Persian Gulf have been difficult to foresee. The rapid pace of 
technological change has compressed planning horizons and product life cycles in many 
industries. Globalization of markets, volatility in currencies, fluctuating raw material and 
energy prices, industry deregulation, have all contributed to an increase in the complexity 
of decisions faced by a firm. 
In periods of stability, such as during the 1950s and 1960s, the past can serve as a 
reasonably reliable model for predictions about the future. No competent planner would 
attempt to project trends indefinitely into the future, but the predicted changes during 
such periods tend to be evolutionary, not revolutionary. Products will be improved, but 
their functions will not change radically. Markets will expand, but individual customers 
and marketing channels will be similar to those of the past. 
In the increasingly turbulent environment of recent years, however, the guideposts of 
the past become unreliable. Planning processes become less formalized; techniques such 
as "logical incrementalism" (Quinn 1989) become more appropriate. Strategic plans rely 
less on forecasts, more on being prepared for a range of eventualities. Creativity and 
innovation are increasingly important for planning. 
In many industries, the role of information systems in the strategic planning process 
has become critical to the development and implementation of effective plans ( k d e r e r  
and Sethi 1991). Increased environmental uncertainty has encouraged firms to attempt to 
regain control by becoming more proactive. The need for creative approaches to the 
design of new systems is both an opportunity and a challenge for information systems 
executives (Couger 1990). Information technology provides a wealth of opportunities for 
achieving competitive advantage, and for shaping the environment to the benefit of the 
firm. Organizations have found also that rapid response to unpredictable events is critical 
to survival (Allaire and Firsirotu 1989). Well-designed architectures for telecommunica- 
tions and data base systems can provide the organizational flexibility to change strategic 
directions as the need arises. 
Scenario analysis is a popular method for aiding strategic planners in considering a 
spectrum of possibilities (Wack 1985a). An industrial scenario is a plausible, internally 
consistent view of the potential environment an organization may face at the end of its 
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planning horizon (Porter 1985). Emphasis is generally on events that affect industry 
structure and the basic competitive position of a firm, such as technological breakthroughs 
or the entry of new competitors. 
A scenario's only purpose is to make the planner aware of possibilities that would not 
otherwise have been perceived and to promote an understanding of the implications of 
these possibilities. Scenarios which do not stimulate thinking in some way are of little 
value in strategic planning. Scenario analysis is thus a technique for stimulating creative 
thought and one measure of the effectiveness of a set of scenarios as compared to another 
set is the number and quality of ideas generated by each. 
Typically, scenarios are presented as alternative futures (Godet 1990). That is, 
planners are asked to envision the future environment as it may exist several years hence. 
We define this as having a forward temporal perspective. Some theorists, however, have 
suggested that forward and backward thinking are different thought processes (Einhorn 
and Hogarth 1987; Weick 1979). If this were the case, then the stimulative power of 
scenarios might be enhanced by retrospective presentation (Crossley and Hooker 1987). 
In this form, scenarios would be written as if they had already happened and planners 
would be asked to imagine that they were looking backwards toward events in the past. 
We consider this a retrospective temporal perspective. 
The motivation for the experiment described here was to explore techniques for 
strategy formulation that rely less on the past and more on the planner's own creative 
powers. Scenarios of a firm's future industrial environment were constructed, but 
presented as if these future events had already taken place. Previous experiments have 
shown that a reversal of temporal perspective causes subjects to provide longer and more 
precise descriptions of imaginary events. The chief issue in this study was whether the 
reverse temporal perspective would produce higher quality plans as well as a greater 
quantity of planning statements, and whether such results would occur in a realistic 
business setting. 
Should retrospective scenarios produce a greater volume of different planning ideas 
and should these ideas be of higher quality than prospective (or forward) scenarios, it 
would then be a potentially useful technique for strategic management, and in building 
planning support systems. Such a finding would call into question the commonly held 
assumption that the direction of time makes no difference in scenario presentation and it 
would provide support to those who have suggested that backward thinking is a different 
mental process than forward thinking (Einhorn and Hogarth 1987). 
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In information systems, many of the tasks performed by practitioners are design tasks: 
programs, systems, interfaces, data bases, networks. A designer generally starts with a 
diagram or at least a mental image of the final output, and then works backward from that 
image to specify requirements (Turner 1987). If reversed temporal perspective causes a 
different way of thinking, then it is important for MIS researchers to be aware of this. 
Retrospective scenarios may be a useful complement to the more traditional data and 
modeling approaches used in the design of decision support systems (DSS). The 
technique would also have significance for disciplines such as management information 
systems (MIS), architecture, and engineering in which a large number of activities are 
design tasks. 
This study evaluates the use of scenario analysis in strategic planning and investigates 
whether temporal perspective in the presentation of scenarios affects planning 
performance. An examination of the literature dealing with scenarios in strategic 
planning is followed by exploration of arguments contrasting differences between forward 
and backward thinking. Then, an experiment to establish whether different results are 
obtained in a planning task where temporal perspective was the treatment variable is 
described. Finally, a research agenda for further investigation is outlined. 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we consider first the research literature pertaining to factors that affect 
strategic planning outcomes. We then review the use of scenarios in planning. Next, 
notions of time theory are presented, followed by arguments for a difference in planning 
performance as a result of shifts in temporal perspective. We then explore the literature 
describing creativity in decision-making. The section closes with a set of research 
questions. 
2.1 Factors That Affect Strategic Planning Outcornes 
What are the characteristics of a "good" strategic plan? What quality criteria might 
be used in comparing one plan with another? The answers to these questions are 
somewhat different for every organization, because of differences in a multitude of 
strategic variables -- industry structure, market share, competitor strengths, available 
markets, etc. However, it is possible to list some general characteristics that good plans 
should include. 
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Steiner (1979) and Hussey (1982) have discussed the formulation of an effective 
strategic plan, and some important attributes can be inferred from their exposition: 
comprehensiveness, creativity, control, effective matching of resources with opportunities, 
internal consistency, cost-effectiveness. Plans should be clearly stated and unambiguous, 
and challenging but realistically achievable. 
The industrial environment is much more turbulent today than when these 
prescriptions were written; are these characteristics still valid? The more recent strategic 
planning literature is voluminous. We found no studies or discussions which attempted to 
define desirable attributes of a completed plan, but analysis of this literature provides 
useful insights. There is support for most of the characteristics implied by Steiner and 
Hussey, but a considerable difference in emphasis. 
The acceleration of change (Toffler 1990) and increased uncertainty (Camillus and 
Datta 1991) in the strategic environment in recent years has made it less and less 
appropriate for plans to be extrapolated from prior year trends. Straight line forecasts are 
less reliable. Consequently, innovation and creativity have become much more desirable 
planning characteristics. Reid (1989) advocates greater rewards and recognition for idea 
generation, and to make it a key job requirement for every employee. Small companies 
with high uncertainty but little potential control may need to devise unique structural 
adaptations (Allaire and Firsirotu 1989). Seemingly mature products can be revived and 
stimulated to grow (Hiam 1990). The long term, being more uncertain, requires greater 
creativity (Carlson 1990). 
The desirability of internal consistency has evolved into a critical requirement for 
integration. The most successful Japanese and Western companies often devote much 
attention to the formulation of mission statements which serve to move cornponents of a 
company in a common direction (Reid 1989). Integration, however, can lead to 
inflexibility, and flexibility is also a prime requirement of strategic planning today (Handy 
1989). Determining the technologies to adopt and the information systems to build has 
become riskier (Clemons 1991). Continuous environmental monitoring (Murphy 1989), 
attention to opportunities and threats around the globe (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1991), and 
awareness of emerging strategic issues (Camillus and Datta 1991) require almost instant 
readiness to change direction, in a coordinated manner. 
2.2 Scenarios 
In stable environments, trends from the past together with an executive's intuitive 
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judgments may provide an adequate basis for strategic planning. These judgments are 
generally based on the executive's past experiences, which provide discernible patterns; in 
environments of slow or moderate change, such patterns may be reasonably reliable for 
predicting future events. There may be a good fit between the executive's cognitive map 
and environmental reality. 
In the more turbulent environments that have been prevalent in recent years, 
however, the past is less useful as a harbinger of what is to come. As Godet (1979) says, 
"the results of our actions today will occur in a world profoundly different from that in 
which they were taken" (p. 5). Fewer reliable patterns, and increased complexity makes it 
more difficult to interpret them correctly. 
Scenarios can serve as models of an organization's environment, helping to clarify 
interrelationships, identify emerging patterns and reduce complexity (Schwenk 1983). 
Their major value is in the stimulation of imagination and the generation of ideas. 
Scenarios are expensive to create and expensive to present in terms of time to view them. 
Methodologies for presentation of scenarios which increase their stimulative impact 
would be advantageous. 
The use of scenarios force planners to recognize that there cannot be precise 
knowledge about the future; this promotes contingency planning and environmental 
monitoring (Vanston, Frisbie, Lopreato, and Poston 1977). Scenario analysis encourages 
consideration of a number of differing points of view, and helps to make executives aware 
of potential threats as well as emerging opportunities. 
Scenarios provide a means for broadening single-point forecasts to encompass several 
variables rather than just one. They emphasize "what might happen" rather than "what 
will happen" (Porter 1985). Generally, several scenarios are constructed and presented to 
management as a set. Ixemhuis (1985) defines a scenario as "a coherent story about the 
business environment with the world of today as the starting point" (p. 30). They are 
hypothetical, outlines rather than full details, multifaceted and holistic, with a special 
ability to represent interacting processes and the cross impacts of events and trends 
(Wilson 1978). They facilitate a long term view and an external focus (Boshoff 1989). 
Scenarios are abstractions of what is important in a situation. 
Linneman and Klein (1983) surveyed the Fortune 1000 companies and found that 
almost half use scenarios in strategic planning. Wack (1985a, 1985b) describes how the 
concepts for using and building scenarios evolved at Royal Dutch/Shell during the 1960s 
and 1970s. He claims that the 1973 scenarios enabled Shell management to recognize the 
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imminence of the OPEC oil crisis sooner than did other oil companies and to take steps to 
prepare for a change to a sellers' market. Yergin (1991), in his history of the oil industry, 
provides support for this contention: prior to the 1973 embargo, "Shell had been 
campaigning for an intergovernmental agreement to share supplies in a crisis" (p. 620). 
2.3 Time Theory 
The way one mentally separates time into past, present, and future is critical to our 
sense of self. Time perception influences behavior, cultural differences, emotions, and 
many other psychological factors (Gonzalez and Zimbardo 1985). Time exists only 
because the universe is changing; if it were not, the past would be the same as the future, 
and time would have no meaning (Gribbin 1985). Entropy, a measure of the disorder of a 
system, is always increasing in our universe (Von Weizsacker 1971); thus, one way to 
measure time is by the amount of entropy increase, which implies that the direction of 
time is always forward. However, physics theory allows for the possibility of entropy 
decrease, and thus of time reversal (Hawking 1988). Einstein believed that the distinction 
between past, present, and future is illusory (Rothman 1987). 
Neustadt and May (1986) maintain that we should think of time as a steady stream, 
rather than being made up of the separate components of past, present, and future. They 
advocate continuous comparison or oscillation from present to future to past and back, 
using both forward and backward thinking, ready to take appropriate action on the basis of 
evolving patterns. In commenting on his studies of black holes, Hawking (1988) proposes 
a concept called "imaginary time" (pp. 143-44). Even though actual time always moves 
forward, there are no such restrictions for the imagination. In the mind, one can go 
backward or forward at will, though it may take considerable mental effort to do so. 
2.4 Temporal Perspective in Scenarios 
Weick (1979) believes that "historicizing an outcome", or pretending that a future 
event has already happened, facilitates the visualization of the event. He refers to several 
examples of studies which support his hypothesis. Bavelas (1973) experimented with two 
groups of subjects; the first group was told: "A professor WILL TAKE, a 6-week 
sabbatical trip in Europe; write out his itinerary." The other group was told: "A professor 
TOOK a 6-week sabbatical trip in Europe; write out his itinerary." The only difference in 
treatments was the change in temporal perspective; i.e., whether this imaginary event will 
occur in the future or has already happened. Bavelas found that the second group's 
descriptions (that is, those with the retrospective scenario) were significantly richer in 
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detail than the prospective group; the first group's were "more fanciful, less detailed, less 
sensible, and shorter." Sevon (1984) reports that, in devising explanations for economic 
conditions in Sweden, subjects described past events in greater detail than possible future 
events. 
In a field study, Boland (1984) worked with management personnel at a large film 
lending library. He constructed scenarios, in the form of accounting reports, which 
depicted the status of the organization several years in the future, based on plausible 
directions that the library might follow in its future development. In a group meeting, 
executives were asked to seriously consider that five years had passed and that the reports 
were actual results of the organization's operations. They were to "look back over the 
preceding five years and attempt to understand what they had done to cause these 
financial results and to explain the results. Participants reported that this exercise 
provided a unique perspective on their planning problems. One subject felt that the 
techniqueaimproved his ability to "look at the relation of any new thrust to the whole." (p. 
878). Another subject reported changing his opinion about activities he had previously 
favored funding: "I would have been for it looking forward, but looking back, I had a 
strong emotional reaction. I didn't like what happened." (p. 879). 
Why does retrospective thinking produce these differences in detail and emphasis 
when the only change is time orientation? Weick (1979) provides a speculative answer: 
In treating a future event as if it is already past, the event seems more sensible because 
you can visualize at least one way in which it could come about. Also, there is a greater 
probability that one or more steps in this process will have been performed in the past, 
bringing to mind past experiences that are similar. It is easier to analyze an event that is 
projected and thought of as already accomplished. Sense-making is facilitated because 
the envisioned completion can be related to similar "cause maps" that have previously 
been enacted. 
A number of authors have argued that authoritative, centralized, rational models of 
decision making must be replaced by an interactive, dialectic approach if organizations are 
to deal effectively with ill-structured situations and high levels of uncertainty (Lindblom 
and Cohen 1979; Susman 1981; Mason and Mitroff 1981). Organizations are evolutionary 
and organizational "actors" continuously try to make sense of actions they have already 
taken; they do not know what they are doing until they have done something and evaluated 
the result (Weick 1979). This is always a retrospective process, a looking backward. 
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Thus, thinking backwards, as required by the use of retrospective scenarios, may be 
intuitively appealing. 
An unstructured task is one that cannot be programmed (Keen and Scott Morton 
1978). A task that is currently unstructured may become structured in the future as our 
knowledge about how to perform it increases and as technology improves, but there has 
been little progress in programming "tasks involving judgment, ambiguity, creativity, and 
volatility of environment" (p. 68). If the design phase of the decision-making process 
(Simon 1977) is unstructured, we cannot determine the methodologies needed to solve the 
problem (Keen and Scott Morton 1978). Improved techniques for stimulating creative 
ideas might be useful in adding structure to the activity design phase of decision-making; 
Elam and Mead (1990) advocate more attention to the creativity-enhancing features in the 
design of decision support software. Lack of structure is also a characteristic of strategy 
formulation (Mitroff, Barabba, and Kilmann 1977). 
Hogarth (1987) emphasizes the importance of imagination in making choices and 
points out that large powers of imagination expand and enrich our choice alternatives. 
Imagination is closely related to creativity. To think creatively, one's mind must resist 
"heavily entrenched cognitive habits" and energetically search for "alternative ways of 
viewing problems" (p. 161). Campbell (1960) proposed a model for creative thought in 
which the mind goes through a large number of "thought trials", similar to trial-and-error 
learning, to find problem solutions. Creativity demands more effort than noncreative 
activities because it requires additional thought trials. Creative solutions are new 
solutions; they must be visualized (Bandrowski 1990). Hogarth (1983) suggests a 
methodology for improving one's imaginative powers by looking at a set of potential 
future outcomes as if they had already happened and then tracing backward to plausible 
causes (in other words, thinking retrospectively). 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1987) contend that every decision involves both forward and 
backward thinking, and that these two methods of thinking are fundamentally different. 
Forward thinking is similar to a mathematical algorithm; the decision maker selects 
available data, evaluates variables, and then predicts an outcome. Backward thinking is 
more suggestive and intuitive, requiring judgment and diagnostic analysis. "It involves 
looking for patterns, making links between seemingly unconnected events, testing possible 
chains of causation to explain an event, and finding a metaphor or theory to help in 
looking forward." (p. 66). 
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Would imagining that a potential future event had already happened improve decision 
making? It might, if the technique can help the decision maker to more clearly envision a 
desirable potential outcome, and then to fully comprehend all the necessary steps to make 
it happen (or to prevent an undesirable potential outcome) (Mitchell, Russo, and 
Pennington 1987). 
2.6 Research Questions 
Based on the above discussion, there is some reason to believe that plans produced 
using retrospective thought may be better than those produced prospectively. Specifically, 
we wish to investigate the following research questions: 
1. Would plans subjects prepare from retrospectively presented scenarios be 
more detailed than those prepared from scenarios presented prospectively? 
2. Would plans subjects prepare from retrospectively presented scenarios be 
considered more effective, more complete, more credible, or more creative 
than plans prepared from scenarios presented prospectively? 
3. Would scenarios presented retrospectively seem more plausible or more 
likely to occur than prospective scenarios? 
3. Research Design 
In this section we describe the research approach, design, and measures used in the 
study along with the threats to validity and how they were handled. 
3.1 Approach 
Because of the need for precise control, a laboratory experiment was preferable to a 
field experiment as a research strategy. Prior laboratory studies have tended to use 
business or psychology students as subjects and relatively simple, artificial tasks. We, 
therefore, decided to select subjects with substantial business experience and a task which 
called for strategy development in a realistic business setting. 
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3.2 Sample 
Sixty-four subjects with extensive business experience participated in the study. 
About two-thirds were employees, in middle level management and professional 
positions, of a large multinational firm in the information processing industry. The other 
third were faculty members in schools of business at a number of different universities and 
who were also educational consultants to the same company. The average level of 
business experience for subjects was 20.4 years. Fifty of the subjects had a masters degree 
or doctorate; the remainder had bachelors degrees. Only eight women participated in the 
study, too few for inferences about gender differences. Further details about the sample 
are provided in Table 9. 
3.3 Design 
A repeated measures experimental design was used. Each subject participated in two 
separate sessions: one looking forward (prospective temporal mode) and one in 
retrospective mode. Thus, each subject served as his or her own control (Kerlinger 1973). 
To control for possible order effects, the participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four treatment groups: combinations of the order of prospective or retrospective temporal 
mode and the two cases. Each group had 16 subjects. 
3.4 Task 
Subjects were asked to consider themselves in the role of the Vice President for 
Strategic Planning of a company and to write a set of planning statements for that 
company. They were also asked to identify items that should be monitored as the plan 
was implemented. Stimulus materials included two 3-page cases about small companies 
in the information processing industry, one a software company and the other a disk drive 
manufacturer, and a set of three one-page industry scenarios for each case. Excerpts from 
one of the cases and from two of the prospective scenarios are provided in the Appendix, 
plus a corresponding excerpt from a retrospective scenario. Subjects were given two 
treatments: one with retrospective scenarios and the other with prospective scenarios. 
Each treatment required a subject to read a case and the corresponding three scenarios. 
Subjects were given approximately one hour to complete the task, including reading 
materials. In retrospective sessions, subjects were asked to imagine that six years had 
passed and that they were looking backward to the previous year of 1993, the year in which 
the scenarios were said to have taken place. These scenarios were written in the past 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-92-04 
tense. Thus, subjects with the retrospective treatment were asked to reconstruct the 
strategies that had led the company to the successful outcomes described. After 
completing the plan, subjects were asked to record "monitoring statements": conditions in 
the environment that should be monitored which might signal a change in strategy. A 
two-page form was provided for recording the planning and monitoring statements. The 
form was divided into seven sections to record action statements, such as "Actions that 
caused revenue growth", and one section for "Conditions Monitored". 
Subjects in prospective treatments were given the same task, except that the scenarios 
were written in the present, and subjects were asked to provide planning statements for 
strategies they would adopt, along with monitoring information. 
For both treatments, all subjects were asked to work hard at envisioning themselves in 
the strategic planning role. 
3.5 Measures 
The principal product from each subject was a set of strategic planning statements and 
monitoring statements. Objective measures recorded were the number of individual 
planning statements generated, and the number of monitoring statements generated. 
In order to evaluate plans subjectively, for quality, statements were rated by two 
expert planners. The raters were both retired corporate planning executives who were 
paid for their services. A rating instrument consisting of 18 questions was developed from 
two strategic planning texts (Steiner 1979; Hussey 1982), based on their description of the 
characteristics of a good strategic plan. For these authors, plans should be comprehensive, 
credible, and consistent. Comprehensiveness implies that a complete range of 
opportunities, threats, and alternatives is considered; a plan lacking this quality would take 
too narrow a view. Credibility implies strategies that utilize the resources available and 
the strengths of the firm, avoid weak areas or work to strengthen them, and do not involve 
unrealistic product breakthroughs or sharp changes in direction. Consistency is required 
so that the strategies pull the firm in the same direction and toward its goals. Six 
questions for each of these constructs were developed. 
A test of inter-rater reliability (Spearman rank-order), run on one-third of the sample, 
produced a correlation of .35, significant at better than the .05 level (p = .28). On this 
basis the rating scores were averaged. 
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Reliability analysis on the rating results indicates that the reliability coefficient for the 
six questions related to comprehensiveness is .94, for the credibility questions is .85, and 
for the consistency questions is .93. 
At the end of each treatment session, after performing a planning task, each subject 
answered 12 Likert-scale questions about their attitudes concerning the experience. 
These were designed to investigate the subjects' perceptions of the realism and usefulness 
of the scenarios and their likelihood of occurrence. 
3.6 Threats to the Study 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) enumerate several threats to both internal and external 
validity of laboratory experiments. Of their internal validity factors, five were potential 
threats in this study: 
1. History: The period between treatments for a subject varied from one day to 
several months. Analysis of variance was performed to compare those with a 
shorter period between treatments to those with a longer period. No 
significant differences were found. 
Order effect: This factor, which concerns the impact of the first treatment 
session on performance in the second, was controlled by the design, in which 
half of the subjects viewed the retrospective scenarios first, while the 
remainder viewed the prospective scenarios first. Statistical tests were run to 
determine the likelihood of an order effect. When none was found the 
treatment groups were combined yielding two groups (retrospective and 
prospective treatments). A statistical test was also performed on the order of 
the cases. No effect was found. 
3. Instrumentation: The same judges were used for all ratings. In their 
evaluations of the planning statements submitted by subjects, judges were not 
explicitly aware of whether the treatment was retrospective or prospective. 
4. Group assignment bias: This was controlled by random assignment of 
subjects to the four groups. Statistical tests comparing the groups on 
demographic factors were performed and are reported in the Results section. 
5. Experimental mortality: For a few subjects, scheduling of the second session 
took considerable persistence, particularly for the one subject who was on 
European assignment. All of the subjects did ultimately complete both 
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sessions, so mortality was not an issue. 
In terms of external validity, all of the Campbell and Stanley factors were potential 
threats: 
1. Reactive effect of testing: The four-group design controlled for any 
decrease in a subject's responsiveness to the treatment variable in the second 
session; the sequence of both the treatment variable and of the two cases 
were varied. No significant effects were found. 
2. Interaction effects of selection biases and treatment variable: This threat 
involves the possibility that those who participate in the study are somehow 
different from those who do not participate. No one who was asked refused 
to participate, but four or five people who had agreed to do so proved 
impossible to schedule and thus had to be dropped (prior to the first session). 
It was not feasible to select subjects randomly from the total population of 
employees or from any logical subset. Also, all the subjects were employees 
of, or consultants to, a single business firm, and this population may be  
significantly different from other populations. Although we have no reason 
to believe the population to be unrepresentative of business planners in 
general, the study should be replicated in other firms and other industries to 
extend its generalizability. 
Reactive effects of experimental arrangements: Such effects would limit 
generalizations about the experiment to persons exposed to the treatment in 
non-experimental environments. It was particularly important that this study 
be as realistic as possible within the constraints of a controlled experiment. 
The cases were based on industries with which the participants were familiar. 
The scenarios were developed in accordance with generally accepted 
principles of scenario construction (Porter 1985) and were similar to 
scenarios used within the firm. The experimental task was carried out in the 
subjects' own offices. 
4. Multiple-treatment interference: This potential threat was controlled by the 
four-group design. 
This section has described the research design for the study. We now turn to data 
analysis. 
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4. Results 
First we describe tests of the research question dealing with objective factors. Then 
we investigate subjective factors: whether subjects using retrospective scenarios produce 
more effective, complete, credible or creative plans than subjects using prospective 
scenarios. We close with a discussion of the attitudes of subjects about the treatments. 
4.1 Objective Factors 
The first research question involved the amount of detail produced by planners in the 
retrospective mode as compared to the prospective mode. This was operationalized as 
the number of planning statements produced by subjects in each mode. Thus the main 
independent variable was temporal perspective and the dependent variable was the 
number of planning statements created. The number of monitoring statements produced 
in each mode was measured also. Table 1 presents the results for these two measures. 
Table 1 
Analysis of Objective Factors 
Variable Mode N Mean SS&MS F Prob. 
P 64 13 .5  
STATEMENTS 70.5  6.40* . 0 1  
R 64 15 .0  
MONITOR P 64 2 .6  
STATEMENTS 
R 64 2 .5  
Mode: P = Prospective; R = Retrospective 
As can be seen in the table, the number of planning statements was significantly 
higher in the retrospective mode, thus supporting the notion that retrospective thinking 
produces more detail. However, there was no difference in the number of monitoring 
statements. 
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4.2 Subjective Factors 
The second research question involved evaluation of completed plans by expert 
judges on the basis of comprehensiveness, credibility, degree of proactivity, realism, and 
creativity. The two raters analyzed all 128 of the submitted plans, scoring them on 18 
questions using 5-part Likert scales. 
A summary of the average results of the raters judgments is shown in Table 2. In this 
table, the 18 questions are grouped into three more general classifications: comprehen- 
siveness, credibility, and consistency. Neither the summaries nor any of the 18 specific 
questions showed significant differences between prospective and retrospective plans. 
Table 2 
Comparison of Subjective Outcomes: Prospective vs. Retrospective 













After completing the rating instrument, the two judges provided the following 
additional data: 
1. A count of the "implementable" statements in each plan. Some subjects 
produced statements that were much too vague to be implemented, such as 
"reduce costs by 10a/ol', or "increase market share". 
2. A numerical rating for each individual planning statement, on a zero to ten 
scale; the judges were asked to rate each of the relatively few outstanding 
statements as nine or ten points, with lower scores for the majority. The 
results are shown in Table 3. Total rating points showed a significant 
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difference for the retrospective sessions. There was no difference in the 
average points per statement or in the number of implementable statements. 
Table 3 
Qualitative Ratings af Judges 
Variable Mode N Mean SS&MS F Prob . 









4.3 Analysis of Moderating Factors 
Additional analyses were performed in order to determine if differences due to 
demographic or other factors might influence outcomes. Subjects could be differentiated 
based on years of business experience, type of organizational affiliation, number of years 
in a planning function, and years in management. It should be noted that any significant 
findings regarding these characteristics would have to be interpreted cautiously, since the 
experiment was not designed specifically to investigate them. 
Subject Type Differences: Forty-one of the subjects were company employees at the 
time of the study; the rest were consultants to the same company. No significant 
differences were found on the basis of subject type as the grouping factor, On two of the 
rating questions, however, the overall means for each question were significantly higher 
for the consultant group than for the company employees. The raters found that the plans 
submitted by the consultants, in both the prospective and retrospective sessions, were 
significantly more proactive and more creative than those submitted by company subjects. 
These results are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4 






Sub j ect Type 








P vs. R 
Interaction 
Cell Means 
Empl . Consultant Marqinal 
2.92  3 . 3 0  3 .06  
3.15 3 . 6 1  3 . 3 1  
3 .04  3 .46  3.19 
4 1  23  64  
Analysis of Variance 
SS&MS F Prob. 
5 . 2 0  4  .52*  . 0 4  
2 .02  2 .92  . 0 9  
0 .05  0 .08  . 7 8  
Cell Means 
Empl . Consultant Marqinal 
3 . 3 1  3 . 7 3  3 .45  
3.40 3 .82  3 .55  
3 .36  3.77 3 . 5 0  
4 1  23  6 4  
Analysis of Variance 
SS&MS F Prob. 
4  . 9 9  4 . 6 1 *  . 0 4  
0 .25  0.39 .53  
0 .00  0 . 0 0  .99 
The 64 subjects in this experiment averaged just over 20 years of business experience. 
An analysis was performed on the rating data with years of experience as the grouping 
factor; there were four approximately equal groups. The results for one of the rating 
questions, on creativity, shown in Table 5, indicates an interaction. The Neuman-Keuls 
analysis (Winer 1971) showed a significant difference for retrospective as compared to 
prospective treatments for the group with the lowest level of experience. 
(Place Table 5 about here) 
As shown in Table 6, similar results were obtained for the rating question on 
proactivity. For this question, the Neurnan-Keuls test showed significant differences, 
favoring the retrospective treatment, for both the 0 to 11 and the 21 to 27 year groups. 
(Place Table 6 about here) 
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Table 5 
Creativity Rating, Grouped by Years of Professional Experience 
Question: THE PLAN IS CREATIVE. IT CONTAINS 
INSIGHTS DERIVED FROM THE SCENARIOS 
OR THE CASE BACKGROUND BUT NOT 
CLEARLY SPELLED OUT I N  THEM (EVEN 




* Neurnan-Keuls Test: P vs. R 
CELL MEANS 
Years of Experience 
0-11 12-20 21-27 > 27 Marg. 
Prosp. 3.47 3.47 3.31 3.56 3.45 
Retro. 4.20 3.24 3.69 3.12 3.55 
Marginal 3.83 3.35 3.50 3.34 3.50 
Count 15 17 16 16 64 
0 1 1  12-20 21-27 > 27 
Years of Experience 
,;; KCh 
CdgQ 
B O P  2.50 g 0 ua 
Ch ?' 
E td Y 
SS MS F Prob. 
Years 4.85 1.62 1.44 -24 
P vs. R 0.38 0.38 0.69 .41 
Interact 6.88 2.29 4.19 .O 1 
for 0-11 years significant a t  1%; 
none others significant 
g 5 ,  m 
A S  B I 
Table 6 
Proactive Rating, Grouped by Years of Professional Experience 
REACTING TO THEM. 
4.25 1 
Question: THE PROPOSED STRATEGIES ARE PROACTIVE. CELL MEANS 
THE PLAN PROPOSES TO CHANGE, INFLU- 
Prosp. 3.07 2.82 3.00 3.38 3.06 
ENCE OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CONDITIONS 
IN THE ENVIRONMENT, RATHER THAN JUST 
I I Retro. 3.87 2.88 3.56 3.00 3.31 1 
Years of Experience 
0-11 12-20 21-27 > 27 Marg. 
Marginal 3.47 2.85 3.28 3.18 3.19 





s z g  rzz 
ma 0 rr. CdgQ 6 O P  *"O g 0 ua 
C h ?  
* 1; STATISTICS 
\ I' 
* Neuman-Keuls Test: P vs. R 
for both 0-11 and  21-27 years 
~ ign i f i can t  a t  1% 
I I 
E td Y 
io5  m 
g ;  g 0-11 12-20 21-27 > 27 
C $  S 
3 
SS MS F Prob. 
Years 6.42 2.14 1.83 . 1 5 
P vs. R 2.19 2.19 3.59 .O 6 
Interact 6.49 2.16 3.55 .02 





Since retrospective thinking takes some discipline and mental effort, it is possible that 
some subjects, while instructed to think retrospectively, were actually thinking 
prospectively. In order to test this notion, an assumption was made that subjects, 
effectively thinking retrospectively, would use the past tense in writing their statements. 
Data were collected, for the retrospective mode sessions, on the number of statements 
submitted by subjects which were phrased in the past tense. The use of past tense 
statements might indicate that subjects had succeeded in the role they were given, that of 
imagining themselves as the chief strategist for the company in the case, and were actively 
playing that role. If so, these subjects might show the largest differences between the 
prospective and retrospective treatments. According to Weick (1979), they should also 
produce the most plausible and detailed plans. 
The data presented in Table 7 provide support for this interpretation. This analysis 
was performed for two equal groups: the high past tense group submitted from 9 to 32 
statements in the past tense, the low group from 0 to 7 statements. Twenty of the low 
group had no past tense statements. The results were significant using the Neuman-Keuls 
test for two of the individual rating questions at 1%, and for two additional ones at 5%. 
The six questions designed to measure consistency showed significance at l%, and the 
grand total measurement at 5%. 
(Place Table 7 about here)  
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Table 7 
Analysis of Past Tense Submissions 
Neuman-Keuls 
Rating Means Interaction Signif.Diff. 
Question N Pros. Retro. F Prob. (31% @5% 
Proactive 
Low 3 2  2 .97  2 .84  
7 . 2 5  . 0 0 9  
High 32 3 . 1 6  3 .78  
Clear, Precise, Implementable 
Low 32 2 . 6 8  2 .44  
3 .67  . 0 6 0  
High 32  3 .12  3 . 5 6  
Realistic in Terms of Capital Provided 
Low 32  2 . 9 4  2 . 7 2  
4 .35  . 0 4 1  
High 32 3 .06  3 .38  
Acceptable Plan in Terms of Cost 
Low 32  2 . 7 5  2 .56  
4.23 - 0 4 4  
High 32 2 .97  3 .38  
Total of 6 Consistency Ouestions 
Low 32 1 7 . 9 7  1 7 . 1 3  
4 .56  .037  
High 3 2  19 .03  20 .50  
Grand Total, 1 8  Ratins Questions 
Low 32  5 6 . 3 7  5 4 . 4 7  
3 .43  . 0 6 9  
High 32 5 9 . 8 4  63.22 
Another difference between these two groups was that the total average score on a 
large number of measures (adding the prospective and retrospective sessions together and 
dividing by two) was significantly higher for the high past tense group. Table 8 
sumarizes this finding. 
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Table 8 
Past Tense Analysis with Average Total Scores 
Mean Ave. 
N Low High F Prob . Variable 
Proactive 
Clear & precise 64 
Creative 64 
Total Comprehensive 64 
Adequate resource 64 
Adequate capital 64 
Acceptable cost 64 
Acceptable profit 64 
Total Consistency 64 
Grand Total Ratings 64 
Number of Statements 64 
Implementable Stmts. 64 
Average Points/Stmt. 64 
Clearly, the group which phrased most of their statements in the past tense produced 
more statements and, in the opinion of the raters, their plans were of higher quality. 
A profile of the high and low past tense groups and of the total sample is given in 
Table 9. It should be noted that the high group contained a higher proportion of outside 
consultants as compared to company employees, a higher proportion of doctorates, and a 
lower level of business experience. 
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Table 9 
Subject Profile: Producers of Past Tense Statements 
High Low Total 








Experience: 0 to 11 years 
12 to 20 years 







4.4 Attitudes of Subjects about Treatments 
These questions addressed the third research question, whether scenarios presented 
retrospectively would be more plausible to subjects or more likely to occur. Would 
subjects be aware of differences among scenarios presented retrospectively and 
prospectively, or does this operate below their level of consciousness? 
None of the 12 post-session questions showed a significant difference between the 
prospective and retrospective modes. Thus, for example, the subjects did not perceive 
that the retrospective scenarios were more realistic, nor helped them visualize the 
future better, nor were more likely to occur. 
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5. Discussion 
This paper has investigated whether the temporal perspective of scenarios used in 
strategic planning, and indirectly the temporal perspective of strategic planners, would 
affect the detail and quality of the plans produced. It was found that subjects generated 
more statements when the scenarios were presented retrospectively, as if they had already 
happened, than when they were presented prospectively. This supports the results of 
Bavelas (1973), as well as other studies cited by Weick (1979), in reporting greater detail 
in the retrospective mode of thought. 
This study extends the generalizability and the external validity of those previous 
experiments. Those studies all used college freshmen, generally psychology students, as 
subjects, whereas we have used professional business people with an average of 20 years in 
industry and a high level of management experience as subjects. The other experiments 
used simple stimulus materials of a sentence or two, while this experiment used tasks and 
materials comparable to an actual business problem (six different full page scenarios and 
two 3-page cases depicting realistic companies and business terminology). A repeated 
measures design was used which provided better control over subject variability than had 
previous experiments. 
These findings provide confirmatory evidence for Weick's (1979) theory that the 
retrospective mode produces "richer detail" (p. 196). Weick's explanation for this 
phenomenon is that retrospection provides an anchoring for the mind which makes it 
easier to think in logical causal paths. The mind is freer and thus more creative. 
Campbell (1960) and Hogarth (1987) both discuss the phenomenon of creativity, and 
Campbell's exposition of "thought trials" which, in his view, are the basis for all creative 
outputs. Campbell's model holds that the sheer number of thought trials is consequential, 
and that more trials will result in greater creativity. Quality is important as well, but the 
significance of quantity is not dependent on quality. Hogarth stresses the importance of 
an active imagination as a necessary requisite of creativity. In this experiment, we believe 
subjects engaged in more thought trials (mental effort) while in retrospective sessions than 
in prospective ones. The evidence for this is that they produced significantly more 
statements in the retrospective mode. This implies, according to the Campbell model, 
more potentially creative ideas. This would have application in brainstorming and in 
design tasks, including product design or system design (Turner 1987; Couger 1990). 
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Stubbart (1987) discusses the greatly increased complexity of a crisis situation that 
adds to the difficulties of making intelligent decisions; advance planning and the 
retrospective approach may reduce this complexity. Keen and Scott Morton (1978) have 
noted that it is often useful to add structure to the design phase of the decision-making 
process, and that approaches for the stimulation of an increased volume of creative ideas 
would be helpful in this regard. This suggests a new structure for decision support systems 
(DSS) and group decision support systems (GDSS) whereby participants would be given 
retrospective scenarios, or perhaps provided with tools for generating their own scenarios, 
as part of the decision-making process (Elam and Mead 1987). It should be noted that the 
cost of applying this approach to an existing DSSJGDSS is quite low. 
The objective measure which was not significant was the number of monitoring 
statements. There is a logical explanation for this outcome: if participants produced more 
planning statements in the retrospective mode because they imagined they were looking 
backward on events that had already happened, their minds would have had to switch into 
the prospective mode in order to construct monitoring statements since, by definition, a 
monitoring statement operates in a forward direction. The spell was broken at that point. 
It would make little sense to construct statements to track events, when at the same time 
one is trying to imagine that those events have already occurred. 
The results of this study suggest that, in terms of the overall population represented 
by the sample, there is evidence of a greater quantity of ideas produced in the 
retrospective mode, but little indication that the quality of those ideas is enhanced by 
thinking backwards. However, when the sample is partitioned, evidence emerges that 
quality is improved for a subset of the sample, raising some intriguing possibilities that 
warrant further investigation. 
The experiment was not designed to differentiate between subjects on the basis of 
cognitive characteristics, but an analysis performed on subject type and past tense 
statements suggest that there may be significant differences between individuals in their 
capacity to adapt to this method. It was noted during the study that some subjects 
expressed pleasure in participating in the retrospective sessions, while others found it 
uncomfortable. One individual whose career had been in forecasting said that he had 
gotten so accustomed to focusing on the future in his job that the exercise of looking 
backward was quite disagreeable. This phenomenon may be analogous to hypnosis - some 
people are easily hypnotized; some require greater skill and manipulation on the part of 
the hypnotist; and some seem completely resistant to hypnosis. It is likely that some 
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people, perhaps unconsciously, resist letting their minds go free enough to enter, 
comfortably, an imaginary role. 
The data suggest also that the retrospective mode had more effect on the 
performance of the subjects with the least business experience (who also, of course, 
tended to be the youngest) and on those subjects who submitted a high proportion of their 
retrospective planning statements phrased in the past tense. The result for the least 
experienced subjects seems to contradict Campbell (1960) that a more varied life 
produces more creativity. Does a life encompass more variety as it ages? Cumulatively, 
the longer the life, the more different experiences will have been undergone. But, it is 
likely also that the proportion of new experiences to those that have been encountered 
previously will decrease as a person ages. The first few years in a business career provide 
many new experiences, but the variety drops off rapidly. It could be argued, then, that a 
person who has completed college and has a few years of professional experience would 
be at the most creative stage of life. He or she would also typically have a higher energy 
level than an older person, an advantage in engaging in the hard work of thought trials. 
Is the retrospective mode easier for less experienced people? Bavelas (1973) and 
others who have studied this phenomenon used college students as subjects. Perhaps it is 
more likely to occur with people with less experience and likely to be younger. This 
experiment was an exercise in imagination, and it is possible that our imagination gets 
weaker as we become set in our ways and as we grow older, particularly if we use it less. 
MuIllford and Gustafson (1988) report that many studies have found that major creative 
contributions are most likely to occur in young adulthood. 
In a large number of rating measures, the group with the highest number of past tense 
statements was rated significantly better in retrospective mode than in prospective. The 
participant questionnaires did not indicate that subjects were aware they were performing 
at a higher level while looking backward. This suggests that, in accordance with Weick's 
(1979) argument, whatever happens in the retrospective mode to cause increased output is 
largely subconscious; the subjects did not seem aware of any differences. 
These results support the notion that retrospective thinking is effective for some 
people in stimulating a greater volume of creative ideas and that those ideas will be of 
higher average quality. In this view, the subjects who submitted statements in the past 
tense were the ones with the most adaptable or unresistant minds and who managed 
successfully to imagine themselves in the retrospective mode. Those who performed best 
retrospectively were the ones who were most involved in the imaginary setting. Thus, for 
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this group, Weick7s theories hold. The outcome was real for them; the company had 
achieved its goals due to their good planning, and they were merely reconstructing the 
strategies that led to those results. They had less uncertainty than in the prospective mode 
because the time dimension was fixed and stable. They wrote statements in the past tense 
because their minds were operating in the past. The judges rated the high past tense 
group to be higher in creativity; this is consistent with Hogarth7s (1987) view that 
imagination is an important component of creativity. 
5.1 Findings for Information Systems 
The findings of this study have implicafions for information systems in a number of 
ways: for strategic planning, for project planning, for systems design, and for problem 
diagnosis. It may be desirable to design executive information systems (EIS) so that 
potential future scenarios can be depicted as if they had already happened, in order to 
force consideration of an unbiased or proactive view of the potential future environment 
and to enhance the strategist's powers of imagination. Volonino and Watson (1990-91) 
advocate such an approach: identify objectives first, then work backward through the 
processes. Mitroff, Barabba, and Kilmann (1977), noting that people who can think 
boldly and creatively about the future are in short supply, advocate training programs and 
"an environment that will do everything in its power to encourage those who are able to 
think about the future" (p. 47). 
The increased volume of ideas produced in the retrospective mode should be useful 
in crisis planning (Perrow 1984) and with failure-prevention efforts in any type of 
long-range project. In large systems projects, planners might be asked to imagine that a 
system has already been implemented, but that it is a failure. The results of the current 
study indicate that these planners will envision more ideas that might cause problems by 
using this reverse brainstorming technique than if they simply try to plan in a forward 
direction, and that the ideas will be more detailed. It should help them develop causal 
links between the current situation and potential future events, possibly avoiding pitfalls. 
This increased benefit would be achieved with virtually no additional cost. 
The information systems function is constantly involved in long-range planning, to 
evolve the firm's infrastructure and to support organizational strategies. Future 
processing volumes must be estimated, data base needs must be envisaged, new 
technologies must be prepared for, new skills must be provided and, most important of all, 
the future direction of the corporate organization must somehow be anticipated. The 
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results of this study indicate that the technique of retrospective thinking may be a useful 
and low cost yay to improve the formulation of such strategies. 
Much attention is now being focused on GDSS, and in their potential for enhancing 
group creativity (Nunamaker, Applegate and Konsynski 1987). It seems very possible that 
the use of retrospective scenarios might affect performance in that domain. This study 
may also be of value in providing insight to cognitive processes. Several authors have 
suggested that it will be difficult to build effective GDSS until we acquire a better 
understanding of the decision-making process (Kraemer and King 1988; Borch and 
Hartvigsen 1991; Mockler 1987). The individual differences found in our study in 
subjects' ability to adapt to the retrospective mode supports the view of Vessey and 
Galletta (1991) that cognitive fit is an important GDSS design variable. 
Finally, in the design of experiments or in construction of theories involving the 
cognitive processes of decision-makers, researchers need to be aware of the potential lack 
of symmetry in forward and backward thought. It is important to determine whether it is 
necessary to control for the retrospective effect in order to avoid confounding of research 
results. 
5.2 Lines for Further Investigation 
This study was designed to yield information that would facilitate future research in 
temporal perspective. It has extended the generalizability of previous experiments by 
using subjects with a high level of business experience and by using a realistic planning 
task. However, the subjects were drawn from a single U. S. company, one with a unique 
culture. The study should be replicated in other organizations, industries, and countries. 
This study was a laboratory experiment; there is a need for field studies to determine 
whether these findings can be generalized to an actual planning situation. The scenarios 
might be designed to be more company-specific than in this study (such as in Boland 
1984), and more proactive (Crossley and Hooker 1987). The task could involve either 
corporate strategic planning or functional planning (e.g., Information Systems). Some 
specific studies suggested by these analyses are summarized below: 
1. To test the notion that subjects with stronger imaginations would have a more 
pronounced retrospective effect, group subjects based on an instrument 
designed to distinguish this characteristic. The design should be repeated 
measui-es. More demographic information, such as, age, sex, IQ, and 
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nationality should be captured. The results of this study would give insights 
into selection of employees to work in strategic planning. 
2. If the first study above confirms the imagination hypothesis, another study 
could be designed to determine whether creativity-enhancing techniques could 
be used to strengthen weak imaginations and whether this might increase the 
retrospective effect in such subjects. 
3. A field study in crisis prevention. The participants would envision a potential 
future crisis, imagine that it had already happened, then devise techniques for 
preventing it. 
4. A study utilizing a group decision support system (GDSS). The software for 
brainstorming would be modified to include a retrospective mode for 
presenting scenarios. This should be a controlled experiment designed to 
answer the question: does the retrospective effect occur in a GDSS 
environment? 
5. A study to determine whether aspects of small group process might enhance 
the effect. 
6. Studies of the effect of providing retrospective scenarios, with realistic 
pictorials and graphics, in executive information systems and decision support 
systems. 
5.3 Research Issues Raised 
This study supports the contention that cognitive processes involved when one is 
looking toward the past are somehow different than when the perspective is forward. 
Researchers who investigate cognitive questions should be aware that temporal 
perspective is a variable that might confound the results of an experiment. They may 
reach erroneous conclusions in some cases if they do not control for this variable. 
It is difficult to devise a suitable task for a controlled experiment in temporal 
perspective. The manipulation must be strong enough to induce the subject to envision 
him or herself in the imaginary role, but not so strong as to influence outcomes. 
This study utilized subjects with substantial business experience, but the results 
obtained were similar to those researchers who used psychology students. Given the 
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similarity of findings to previous studies, some support is provided for the notion that 
results of studies using students may be extended to other populations. 
6. Conclusions 
Using scenarios of realistic future industrial environments and subjects with 
substantial business experience, this study investigated the impact of temporal perspective 
on the generation of ideas in the strategy formulation process. It was found that 
retroactive presentation of the scenarios increased the volume of strategic planning 
statements generated. Subsequent analysis indicated that the retroactive mode enhanced 
creativity for some subjects, but not for all. It appears that the individuals most positively 
influenced by the reverse temporal perspective are those with the strongest imaginations. 
This conclusion is based on the finding that the subjects with significant increases in ideas 
generated while in the retrospective mode were those who phrased their statements in the 
past tense, and who might therefore be assumed to be imagining that they are thinking in 
the reversed time perspective. 
The planning statements generated by the participants were evaluated by two 
experienced planning executives. The overall sample did not show any evidence of 
increased quality of the statements while in the retrospective mode. However, for that 
portion of the sample noted above who phrased their statements in the past tense, there 
was some evidence of a greater level of quality in that mode. 
In periods of high environmental turbulence and uncertainty, when the past becomes 
increasingly unreliable as a guide to future developments, strategic planners require 
methods and tools which enable them to view the future as free as possible from the 
constraints imposed on their thinking by their past experiences. Churchman (1968) has 
said that "good planners are continuously asking the most searching, radical, and 
ridiculous questions" (p. 164). This study indicates that the presentation of scenarios 
retroactively is a promising technique for encouraging planners to formulate a greater 
volume of ideas; thus it can be said to enhance creativity. If designers of DSS and GDSS 
for strategic planners can build the capability to generate retrospective scenarios into their 
systems, perhaps using graphics to enhance the visualization of the scenarios for the 
planners, a greater volume and variety of planning ideas might be forthcoming. The 
finding that some participants are influenced by this technique and some are not makes it 
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advisable to use it selectively. Additional research is needed to determine more precisely 
the personality types that are most receptive to this approach. 
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Appendix 
Excerpts from the cases and scenarios are provided below. There were two cases: 
MicroByte, Inc., a rapidly growing computer software company, and DoverDrive, Inc., a 
successful disk drive manufacturer. Each case was three pages in length. There were 
three scenarios for each case, approximately one page each. The scenarios described the 
environment for the industry, not for individual firms. 
Excerpts from MicroByte Case: 
Congratulations! You've just been named the Vice President for Strategic Planning of 
MicroByte, Inc. . . . You will report directly to the CEO . . . MicroByte now has more than 
1,400 dealers worldwide who have become the core of its distribution network . . . 
MicroCAD is still the principal product, providing about 70% of the revenues in 1987 . . . 
The most appropriate PCs for MicroCAD are the most powerful ones . . . Other products 
include CADICamera, which translates photos into drawings, and a $95 hobbyists version 
of MicroCAD. . . . Programers are considered the company's most important asset. . . 
There is as yet no significant penetration of Fortune 1000 firms. . . It is estimated that 5% 
of U. S. architects and 2% of other architects have used MicroCAD or a similar product. 
Excerpts from MicroByte Scenarios (Pros~ective): 
I. "Intensive Research" Scenario: 
By 1992, most companies in the software industry will have to invest much more 
heavily in research and development than in 1987. Architects, draftsmen, and other 
potential users are becoming much more sophisticated and will demand more 
sophisticated applications. . . a CAD software product will have to incorporate the latest 
techniques in artificial intelligence and expert systems. . . . Programmers will be in very 
short supply; the best ones will command high salaries . . . 
II. "Programmer Productivity" Scenario: 
The most important development in the PC CAD industry in the early 1990s will 
involve significant breakthroughs in programmer productivity. . . . breakthroughs will 
come from the application of artificial intelligence and expert systems techniques to the 
production of new software. . . . fewer programmers will be needed . . . However, since 
CAD applications can be expected to be considerably more complex, some must have 
advanced skills. . . . R&D investments will increase, but emphasis will be on development 
rather than pure research . . Large software firms will be attracted to this market as its 
growth potential is perceived, putting downward pressure on prices." 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-92-04 
Excerpt from a Retrospective Scenario (Tntensive Research): 
By 1992, most companies in the software industry were forced to invest much more 
heavily in research and development than in 1987. . . Architects, draftsmen, and other 
potential users had become much more sophisticated . . . 
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